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SUMMARY
Real-world experience underscores the complexity of interactions among multiple drivers of climate change
risk and of howmultiple risks compound or cascade. However, a holistic framework for assessing such com-
plex climate change risks has not yet been achieved. Clarity is needed regarding the interactions that
generate risk, including the role of adaptation and mitigation responses. In this perspective, we present a
framework for three categories of increasingly complex climate change risk that focus on interactions among
the multiple drivers of risk, as well as among multiple risks. A significant innovation is recognizing that risks
can arise both from potential impacts due to climate change and from responses to climate change. This
approach encourages thinking that traverses sectoral and regional boundaries and links physical and so-
cio-economic drivers of risk. Advancing climate change risk assessment in these ways is essential for
more informed decision making that reduces negative climate change impacts.
INTRODUCTION
We live in a highly networked world where multiple drivers of
climate change risk interact, as do the risks themselves. Con-
nections among socio-economic, environmental, and techno-
logical systems transmit risk from one system or sector to
another, creating new risks or exacerbating existing ones.1–5
For example, global warming of 2C above pre-industrial levels
is projected to reduce global yields of staple crops by 5%–
20%.6 Greenhouse gas mitigation options can also increase
food insecurity if bioenergy crops displace food crops, or can
lead to biodiversity loss from land use change for cropping and
afforestation.7 Concurrently, trade networks link distant food
systems together and can thus compensate for reduced food se-
curity, but they can also create new risks of global impacts, such
as multiple-breadbasket failure;8 more rapid spread of disease,
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pests, and other invasive species;9 and new threats to local food
security from changes in commodity prices caused by policy
choices made elsewhere.10 These interactions include both
those risks caused by climate change and those involving re-
sponses to climate change through adaptation and mitigation11
(hereafter collectively termed climate change risks), where risk is
understood to refer to the potential for negative or positive out-
comes for human or ecological systems.
We use the term complex to communicate the diversity of in-
teractions among sectors and systems12 that can amplify or
reduce climate change risks. Although risk assessment ap-
proaches that consider such interactions and networks are
beginning to be used,13–15 many climate change risk assess-
ments often ignore interactions in part or in full. In doing so,
they may significantly misestimate risk, such as when single-
sector models of food production misrepresent the direction,
magnitude, and spatial pattern of risk compared with analyses
that consider cross-sectoral interactions.12,16 However, for con-
venience and tractability, analysts and managers tend to break
risk assessments into silos,17 often taking a component-ori-
ented, rather than interaction-oriented, view.1 For example, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) typically di-
vides its assessment into three separate working groups
focused on (1) physical climate change; (2) climate impacts,
vulnerability, and adaptation responses (by sector and region);
and (3) emissions mitigation (by sector). This approach is useful
for synthesizing thousands of discipline-specific studies and
also reflects the largely sectoral approach ofmany governments.
Cross-working-group IPCC assessments, such as special re-
ports on managing the risk of extreme events and disasters to
advance climate change adaptation (SREX),18 global warming
of 1.5C,6 oceans and cryosphere,11 and climate change and
land,5 help to develop more integrated approaches to risk. How-
ever, by tending to divide risk assessment into individual sectors,
regions, asset classes, or types of response options, assess-
ments can miss important interactions that generate climate
change risk.12,19
Multiple material and conceptual boundaries exist that can
constrain the assessment of climate change risk. Four major
types are sectoral, temporal, spatial, and response-option
boundaries (Figure 1). Interactions across these boundaries
often amplify or reduce risk relative to when interactions are
ignored.20,21 Indeed, recent evidence indicates how some of
the most severe climate change impacts, such as those from
deadly heat or sudden ecosystem collapse, are strongly influ-
enced by interactions across multiple sectoral, regional, and
response-option boundaries.3,22 Similarly, how governance or
institutional systems implementing climate change responses
act across these boundaries also affects the nature of risk.23
While in some cases these interacting effects may have small im-
pacts, in many situations the risks cannot be understood without
considering these interactions.14 For instance, many water
agencies’ long-range investment plans are much more vulner-
able to the interactions of climate change with other socio-eco-
nomic factors than to the physical impacts of a changing climate
on their own.24–26 Accounting for these multiple complexities is
necessary for assessments tasked with informing national gov-
ernments on climate change risks, as well as for understanding
andmanaging risks atmore local scales, such as cities, or across
scales in the private sector.14
In this perspective, we synthesize recent work describing
complex climate change risk—such as concepts of compound,
connected, and cascading interactions—and reflect on the con-
sequences for risk assessment and response. We then establish
a framework for risk assessment that encompasses increasing
levels of complexity by including interactions among multiple
drivers of climate change risk (including adaptation and mitiga-
tion responses), as well as among multiple risks. We demon-
strate the framework using diverse case studies from cities, fish-
eries, and finance to illustrate how risk assessments can better
consider and categorize complex risk and thus enable more
informed and effective responses.
WHERE ARE WE NOW?
Risk in recent climate change assessments has been defined as
the potential for adverse consequences for human or ecological
systems, recognizing the diversity of values and objectives
Figure 1. Multiple material and conceptual boundaries exist across which interactions can dampen or amplify climate change risks
Examples include (A) cross-sectoral interactions such as between water, energy, food, and health; (B) temporal lags such as between climate extremes and
behavior change; (C) spatial telecoupling such as for food trade networks and breadbasket failures; and (D) interactions of multiple mitigation and adaptation
response options such as urban greening and fossil-fueled air conditioning as responses to extreme heat.
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associated with such systems.27 For example, a climate hazard,
such as a heatwave, interacts with human exposure and vulner-
ability, creating risk to human health. However, many new de-
scriptors are emerging to convey the complexity of risks from
climate change. To assess the extent to which this development
represents the emergence of a common understanding of com-
plex risk in climate change research and in policy-relevant risk
assessments, we analyzed the special reports released for the
IPCC’s sixth assessment cycle: special reports on global warm-
ing of 1.5C,6 oceans and cryosphere,11 and climate change and
land5 (see experimental procedures). These special reports
reflect the most recent global synthesis of climate change risks
and are intended to cut across the traditional IPCC working
group divisions in their assessment. We supplemented this
with a review of types of complex risk in peer-reviewed literature
since 2015 (see supplemental information).
Our analysis shows that the climate change research commu-
nity has not yet achieved a consistent framework for assessment
of complex climate change risks. The IPCC acknowledges risks
can aggregate frommultiple sectors,12 but has only two glossary
definitions for types of complex risk, namely, compound risk28
and emergent risk29 (Table 1). Moreover, the IPCC notion of
compound risk focuses most on the interaction of climate haz-
ards determining a risk28 and complex risk terms were most
often applied to the hazard determinant of a risk. This aligns
with a growing research field on climate hazard interac-
tions,2,30–33 such as heavy precipitation coinciding with a
storm surge to increase likelihood of flooding,34 often termed
compound weather or climate events.31 At least a dozen other
terms have been used in recent IPCC special reports to describe
differing degrees of complexity for each risk determinant—haz-
ard, exposure, and vulnerability—with some terms applied to
multiple determinants of risk, as well as to risk from climate
change (Figure 2 and Table 1). Typically, the usage of these
terms is not aligned with a particular risk typology and is instead
reflective of individual author choices, making a consistent inter-
pretation and synthesis difficult to achieve (Tables S1 and S3).
The descriptions of risk are also generally narrowly construed,
considered to unfold over a relatively short period of time and
are limited in scope to a subset of determinants of risk.
Furthermore, in the existing IPCC framework, risk has been
framed predominantly in the context of potential climate change
impacts.11 Risk in the context of climate change adaptation and
mitigation responses,41 such as the financial, political, reputa-
tional, and technological risk related tomitigation or the potential
for adverse outcomes frommaladaptation,42 has been identified
and discussed in the literature but not yet integrated with the
overall IPCC risk framework. Rather, the risks associatedwith re-
sponses, such as competition for resources between different
adaptation and mitigation options or risk from increased policy
instability, are presented and discussed separately.5,43 Howev-
er, real-world decisions do often represent trade-offs across
those different risks. For example, a policymaker concerned
with coastal hazards has to consider the risks from sea-level
rise to coastal properties as well as the risk to policy stability
and personal electoral fortunes if a sufficiently large or vocal
segment of the population does not support a proposed coastal
hazard management plan.44,45 Without clear specification of risk
types and an inclusive framework for integrating more
complexity into risk assessment, there is a danger that percep-
tions of climate change risk remain siloed and thus that coherent
responses will not emerge.
Beyond IPCC, multiple terms have been used to describe
complex risk (Tables 1 and S3). Many of these terms focus on
Table 1. Complex risk terms with and without an IPCC definition
Types of complex risk with IPCC definition
Compound risk compound risks arise from the interaction of hazards, which can be characterized by single extreme events or multiple
coincident or sequential events that interact with exposed systems or sectors28
Emergent risk a risk that arises from the interaction of phenomena in a complex system; for example, the risk caused when geographic
shifts in human population in response to climate change lead to increased vulnerability and exposure of populations in the
receiving region29
Types of complex risk with no IPCC definition
Aggregate risk the accumulation of independent determinants of risk35
Amplified risk the substantial enhancement of background risk through combination or concentrations of determinants of risk in time or
space36
Cascading risk one event or trend triggering others; interactions can be one way (e.g., domino or contagion effects) but can also have
feedbacks; cascading risk is often associated with the vulnerability component of risk, such as critical
infrastructure1,22,37,38
Interacting risk the combinations of hazards and their reciprocal influences between different factors and coincidences among
environmental drivers38
Interconnected risk the complex interactions among human, environment, and technological systemswith physical interdependencies that are
closely linked with interconnected social interactions38
Interdependent risk complex systems involve interactions and interdependencies that cannot be separated and lead to a range of
unforeseeable risks39
Multi-risk the whole risk from several hazards, taking into account possible hazards and vulnerability interactions entailing bothmulti-
hazard and multi-vulnerability perspectives40
Systemic risk systemic risk results from connections between risks (networked risks), where localized initial failure could have disastrous
effects and cause, at its most extreme, unbounded damage4
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climate hazards. However, the boundaries among these defini-
tions can blur, and concepts of complex climate change risk
continue to evolve.30,31 Although some definitions refer only to
hazards or vulnerability, others take a more integrated perspec-
tive on interacting human and environmental systems.1,37 Over-
all, these approaches indicate that risk may arise from a number
of pathways created by interacting drivers, and that understand-
ing the potential for either positive or negative outcomes46 and
their severity requires appreciation of this network of interac-
tions.30,31,47 These interactions may include events attributed
to anthropogenic climate change, such as a false spring;31 other
human-induced events, such as conflict;48 preconditions of risk,
such as saturated soil, which compounds extreme rainfall to
affect flooding;31 and the systemic vulnerability of societies
reliant on complex electricity, communication, and transporta-
tion networks.14,30,31 Other climate assessments are also
acknowledging complex risks; for example, multi-sector risk
assessment and management in the US Fourth National Climate
Assessment,14 risk to health from multi-exposure pathways in
the US Global Change Research Program Climate and Health
Assessment,49 interacting risks in the UK Climate Change Risk
Assessment,13 and globally interconnected risks in the Global
Risk Report.15 The need for transdisciplinary approaches to
complex climate change risk has also seen the development of
Figure 2. The diversity of complex climate
change risk terminology
Terms used to describe complex climate change
risk in recent IPCC Special Reports mapped onto
the IPCC risk framework used in these IPCC
Special Reports. White text shows terms used to
describe a given determinant of risk (that is, haz-
ard, exposure, and vulnerability). Black text shows
terms used to describe complex risk. Red text
highlights terms that have been used to describe
both risk and a determinant of risk, such as
‘‘compound risk’’ and ‘‘compound hazard.’’ Note
that this visual depiction of risk terminology does
not include the role of responses to climate
change affecting risk determinants or existing
risks or in driving new risks through positive or
negative side effects of responses.
new collaborations such as the My
Climate Risk Activity of the World Climate
Research Programme50 and Future Earth
Risk Knowledge Action Network.51 How-
ever, there remains no common frame-
work for assessment of complex climate
change risks.
This analysis of IPCC special reports
and other recent literature highlights
three important gaps where a more holis-
tic approach to climate change risk
assessment is needed. First, interacting
climate hazards are now a key focus for
risk assessment, especially for extreme
events such as concurrent heat and
drought; indeed, the IPCC definition of
compound risk focuses on ‘‘interaction
of hazards.’’28 However, this physical sci-
ence effort on hazards has not yet been
integrated with the multiple interactions among ecological, so-
cial, and economic drivers of exposure and vulnerability. For
instance, low-income workers are often employed outdoors
and live in poorly ventilated housing, spend a greater portion of
their income on healthcare, and lose relativelymore frommissing
a day of work, all making them more vulnerable and exposed to
morbidity and mortality from heat waves.52 Although integrating
quantitative and qualitative knowledge of interactions between
physical, ecological, and social systems remains challenging,
knowledge co-production approaches to complex risk assess-
ment that use integrated risk assessment models,53,54 story-
lines, and scenario planning can highlight interactions across
systemboundaries that generate risk not evident frommore con-
ventional climate impact projections.31,55,56
Second, responses to risk are often excluded as drivers of risk
even though they play a key role in driving potential outcomes,
including inaction, and are well recognized in financial and policy
domains.37,57 Holistic consideration of risks related to climate
change impacts involving the real and perceived risks associ-
ated with response options is necessary in risk management
and decision-making processes.53,58 Understanding response
options as part of climate change risk better explains why deci-
sionmakers sometimes do not take actions to reduce risk arising
from climate hazards, for example, given risks related to
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stranded financial assets,37 reputation among core constitu-
ents,59 or reliance on novel but untested technological solu-
tions.60–62 This broader framing of potential trade-offs and co-
benefits from interacting responses is essential in the context
of multiple interlinked sustainability goals, including stabilizing
the climate, reducing hunger, protecting biodiversity, and
improving human health.63 Including climate change responses
as potential drivers of risk expands the scope of risk assessment
to accommodate positive and beneficial outcomes, not just
negative, adverse ones. This is vital for making informed re-
sponses more transparent and actionable within complex social
decision-making structures,54,64 where stakeholders attach
different weights to the diversity of positive and negative
consequences that can arise from both action and inaction.
Third, risk assessment needs to include interactions among
multiple risks, not just among the determinants of a risk. Risk
has come to be framed in singular terms such as compound
risk,28 cascading risk,38 or multi-risk40 when referring to how
multiple drivers of a risk interact. However, as the collision of
climate change and the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic has shown, the interaction of multiple risks can over-
whelm the capacity to respond.65 For example, in 2020, commu-
nities in the United States, India, Fiji, and Bangladesh faced
evacuation from flooding and tropical cyclones at the same
time as social distancing or stay-at-home orders were in
place.65,66 In Zimbabwe, consecutive droughts followed by an
unseasonal outbreak of African migratory locusts67 left millions
at risk of acute food insecurity during June–September 2020,
while the COVID-19 pandemic made social distancing at
communal water and food distribution points very difficult.68 In
turn, climate change is also projected to worsen existing risk of
undernutrition or to change the geography of future infectious
disease outbreaks.69,70 Considering interactions among these
multiple risks shifts risk assessment from a concentration on in-
dividual climate hazards or interactions of hazards as a single
event, such as a cyclone, to a set of multiple events interacting
continuously with evolving social and economic conditions.
A WAY FORWARD: CATEGORIES OF COMPLEX RISK
Across the suite of terms that have been applied to climate
change risk for human and natural systems, there is a com-
monality: an interaction or aggregation of the determinants
of risk—hazard, exposure, and vulnerability—and of multiple
risks. We propose an expanded assessment approach that
considers responses as an additional determinant of risk
and emphasizes what these interactions are (compound,
cascade, and aggregate) and where and how they originate.
This approach makes the details of interactions within and
among determinants of risk, as well as among multiple risks,
explicit and thus can help guide more detailed and accurate
risk assessment.
We propose that climate change risk assessment can be orga-
nized into three categories of increasing complexity based on
whether it considers (1) only a single driver for each determinant
of risk, (2) multiple interacting drivers within determinants of risk,
and (3) interacting risks. We use determinant to refer to hazard,
vulnerability, exposure, and response, within which the term
driver refers to individual components of these, such as temper-
ature (a driver within the hazard determinant) or income (a driver
Figure 3. Three categories of increasingly complex climate change risk
(A) Category 1: interactions among single drivers (small circles) for each determinant of a risk, namely hazard, vulnerability, exposure, and response to climate
change.
(B) Category 2: interactions of multiple drivers (e.g., compounding vulnerabilities of education and income) within each determinant of risk, as well as among the
determinants of a risk.
(C) Category 3: interacting risks.
Across categories 2 and 3, compounding and cascading interactions, together with aggregations, generate increasing complexity for risk assessment. We use
‘‘determinant’’ to refer to hazard, vulnerability, exposure, and response, within which the term ‘‘driver’’ refers to individual components, such as heavy pre-
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within the vulnerability determinant), that interact to affect the
overall nature of a risk, such as heat mortality.
Based on these criteria, category 1 largely reflects the status
quo of existing climate risk assessments5,6,11 where a single
driver for each of climate hazard, vulnerability, and exposure
interact (Figure 3A). However, category 1 goes further by explic-
itly recognizing that a response to climate change can also be a
driver of risk.
Even for category 1, the complexity of climate change risk is
often only partly accounted for in existing risk assessments. For
instance, multiple studies project increased risk from dangerous
heat for people or biodiversity based on their exposure but do
not also consider a driver for vulnerability or responses to heat
stress.71,72 For some risks, responses to climate change may be
the dominant driver of potential outcomes. It is important to
note that a response, as we define it here, can be a human inter-
vention directly targeting the risk being assessed, such as irriga-
tion to reduce risk to food security from heat,73,74 but can also
be an adaptation response in another sector12 or a greenhouse
gas mitigation project that affects the risk being assessed, such
as expansion of conservation areas for biodiversity or of bioenergy
crops that also affect food security.7 This inclusion of how a
response in one sector or region can drive another risk that the
response action had little or no intention of influencing is an impor-
tant feature of an effective assessment approach for complex
climate change risk. The role of climate change responses in
driving risks is not limited to unintended consequences, though:
a decision-maker might very consciously accept an increased
risk elsewhere as long as a climate change responsedelivers a so-
lution to that decision maker’s core concern. Clearer understand-
ing and recognition of different people, populations, and ecosys-
tems being affected by different responses,75 including
disproportionate effects, can help us better understand and char-
acterize such risk trade-offs and the values that underpin such
choices. Lastly, non-human response can also be included,
such as migration of species in response to temperature
change.76
Although adaptive capacity, as the capability to respond, has
been conceptualized as a component of vulnerability since the
IPCC Third Assessment Report,77 distinguishing between re-
sponses and vulnerability highlights specific response actions
available to decision makers that drive potentially negative or
positive outcomes. These options include incremental or trans-
formative actions (both reactive and proactive) that aim to
manage change,78 as well as the consequences of inaction or re-
sponses noted as maladaptation.79 For example, mitigation and
adaptation responses carry the potential for positive and
adverse consequences, including through multiple trade-offs
and co-benefits with other sustainable development goals, and
thereby affect the overall nature and complexity of risk.80,81
The inclusion of response in risk assessment also allows for
greater understanding of the relationship between climate
change risk and resilience because responses are a key part of
the governance and learning about the feedbacks that shape so-
cial-ecological systems.82 As such, the inclusion of response as
a determinant of risk helps further the foundations for a frame-
work-level integration of concepts of climate resilient develop-
ment pathways and climate change risk within climate change
assessments.
Category 2 is distinguishable from category 1 because it con-
siders interactions among multiple risk drivers both within and
across the determinants of a risk (Figure 3B). For example, mul-
tiple hazard drivers, such as concurrent heat and drought,
interact with each other to increase the severity of risk.2
Research on these and other examples of interdependence
among hazard drivers is growing, including the development of
typologies for compoundweather and climate events.31,32 These
approaches fit within category 2, but category 2 expands this
risk assessment space by highlighting the need for equal atten-
tion to interactions among multiple drivers of vulnerability, expo-
sure, and responses. Such interactions include those among the
multiple drivers of vulnerability in the form of gender, age, and
race that increase risk of mortality and morbidity from extreme
heat,52 or the interactions amongmultiple mitigation and adapta-
tion response options, such as city trees mitigating urban heat
islands and thereby reducing energy use from air conditioning.83
Interactions among individual drivers can be uni- or bidirectional.
We use the term compound to describe these interaction types
because it is increasingly widely used in the literature, including
for interacting climate hazards,30,31 and is neutral with respect to
whether interactions amplify positive or negative risk outcomes.
Risk can also be affected by the aggregation ofmultiple indepen-
dent drivers, such as exposure to heat being increased for out-
door workers who also live in the tropics.84 The diversity of inter-
actions in category 2 makes it highly complex, comprising
interconnections among drivers of risk across human, natural,
and technological systems.
Category 3 considers, additionally, the interactions of multi-
ple risks, including both those associated with climate change
and those related to other drivers. For example, a multi-bread-
basket failure can affect financial, food, and human security
through major financial losses to agricultural insurers globally
and enhanced potential for civil unrest.85 Similarly, regions
that rely on expanding and intensifying livestock production
for rural development could face multiple risks from climate
change impacts on feed sources, shifting consumer prefer-
ences for alternative protein sources, along with more variable
commodity prices linked to increased speculation on bioenergy
markets.86 Risk assessment in category 3 is inherently cross-
sectoral and offers opportunities to link with a growing method-
ology on nexus approaches to sustainable development that
simultaneously examine multiple sectors,12 such as the food-
energy-water-health nexus.21,87 This focus on interactions
among multiple risks across different sectors and regions is
important because they are a reality people need to manage
regardless of the level of quantitative assessment available to
inform decision making.30,56 If each risk is assessed indepen-
dently, the severity of individual risks and of the overall risk
landscape can be underestimated.37,40,88 In category 3, each
risk may have its own set of drivers for hazard, exposure,
vulnerability, and responses, but these can also be shared be-
tween risks. Interactions among risks can be uni- or bidirec-
tional in nature and are referred to as compounding interac-
tions, such as risk of biodiversity loss compounding risk of
food insecurity and risk to health.89 In contrast, cascades are
defined as one risk triggering multiple other risks in a prolifera-
tion of interactions,1,22,38 such as the cascade of the risk of tree
death from drought affecting the risks to property and to human
ll
OPEN ACCESS
494 One Earth 4, April 23, 2021
Perspective
health from wildfires that affects the risks to property, fresh-
water ecosystems, and to human life from landslides.30,90,91
Across all three categories, the different temporal and spatial
scales over which drivers of risk, aswell asmultiple risks, interact
require consideration of when and where interactions augment
or reduce risk. For example, a risk may increase through tempo-
ral compounding when hazard drivers interact over time, such as
when the succession of heavy precipitation events connected to
the same large-scale climate system in a region can result in
flooding.31 In contrast, temporal or spatial aggregation occurs
when the risk drivers are independent of each other, such as
the co-occurrence of a wildfire and an earthquake.92 These
same dynamics apply to the interaction or aggregation of multi-
ple risks. For instance, in the humanitarian field, risk of violent
conflict interacts over time and space with risk of famine to
determine where and when humanitarian relief workers can
act.93 More generally, climate change in the form of slow-onset
events and short-term shocks will continue to alter risk profiles
over time,94 as will the temporal dynamics of response options
affected by inertia in their implementation or the time taken to
reach adaptation limits.95 As such, shifting to a more dynamic
perspective of risk over time and space can help focus more
attention on interactions among the various response options
required to facilitate recovery and for risk management.92,94
FROM ASSESSMENT TO INFORMED RESPONSE
To inform decision making, assessment of complex climate
change risk will often require consideration of the four determi-
nants of risk (category 1), the multiple interacting risk drivers
within each determinant (category 2), as well as interacting risks
(category 3). We suggest scoping risk assessment to one of
these categories presented, and describing interactions as
either aggregate, compound, or cascading (Figure 3). Building
Figure 4. Complex interactions that
generated risk to infrastructure during the
2018 European heatwave
Arrows indicate interactions and addition signs
indicate aggregation of the individual drivers
of risk.
from available research and incomplete
information, climate change risk assess-
ment may often begin at lower levels of
complexity but should be clear about the
need to regularly update risk assess-
ments based on new knowledge of inter-
acting risk drivers and interacting risks,
including the role of responses to real
and perceived risk.
Here we use examples that bridge from
present to future risks to show how com-
plex climate change risk assessment can
better support approaches to reduce
negative risk outcomes. The following
cases demonstrate the nature of interact-
ing risks from a broad range of sectors
and how a category 3 approach builds
on category 2 and category 1, thereby better enabling risk
assessment that considers interconnected socio-economic,
environmental, and technological systems that generate climate
change risk.
Complex climate risk during the 2018 European
heatwave
Although assessment of climate change risk will often begin with
category 1, stopping there has potentially severe limitations for
risk assessment and response. This is illustrated by understand-
ing interactions that generated risk during the case of the 2018
European heatwave. Between May and August 2018, different
sub-regions of Europe experienced multiple, concurrent heat ex-
tremes that were compounded by severe drought condi-
tions.33,96,97 Low water levels in rivers led to restrictions for ship-
ping, nuclear power plants were shut down because of
insufficient water for cooling, and railway lines buckled under
the heat.98 Crop yield reductions of up to 50% were reported
from Central and Northern Europe alongside losses in the live-
stock sectors.33,99 A category 1 assessment of this case concen-
trates on a subset of interactions for a single risk. For example, risk
to transport can be described as the interaction of extreme heat
(hazard), thermal tolerance of rail infrastructure (vulnerability),
the length of time rail infrastructure experienced prolonged heat
conditions (exposure), and how low water levels due to drought
resulted in restrictions imposed on shipping, an alternative trans-
port mode to rail (response).98 Category 1 assessments like this
could be conducted for each of the domains of value, such as
tourism, electricity generation, or agricultural production.
However, a category 1 assessment excludes key information
because the severity of risk was often determined by interactions
among multiple drivers within each determinant of a risk, better
described by a category 2 climate change risk assessment
(Figure 4). For example, the interacting drivers of strong winds,
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drought, and extreme heat led to severe wildfires that resulted in
extensive damage to infrastructure and extended over popular
tourist areas, claiming more than 100 lives in the Attica region
of Greece.98 The risk to infrastructure from wildfire was further
compounded by ecological responses to the early spring, where
increased vegetation growth contributed to faster than normal
soil moisture depletion,100,101 interacting with human responses,
including spatial planning and inadequate coordination of evac-
uation and firefighting measures.98 In addition to risk to infra-
structure from wildfire, vulnerability of infrastructure was deter-
mined by the dependency of both energy and transport on
available water for electricity generation and shipping, while
transport infrastructure was further vulnerable to extreme heat.98
Similar category 2 assessments could be undertaken for multi-
ple other sectors, such as agricultural productivity, food security,
or food prices.97 For example, crop loss has been attributedmore
to drought stress rather than heat stress in this heatwave’s com-
pound drought and extreme heat.102,103 This highlights how inter-
actions of drivers can have different interaction effects. Further,
agricultural losses in Northern and Central Europe were partially
compensated by a ‘‘water seesaw’’ event among hazards where
drought in Northern and Central Europe was correlated with
higher rainfall in Southern Europe, such that favorable yield condi-
tions in Southern Europe prevented greater market volatility and
price spikes for consumers.97,100 At the global scale in 2018, a
category 2 lens would identify that near-simultaneous heat haz-
ards occurred across Europe, Asia, and North America, leading
to an accumulation of risk to food prices globally. However, how
these risks to food security interact with other risks,12 in this
case to infrastructure, economic output, and human health, re-
quires a category 3 assessment. The following three cases
demonstrate how a category 3 approach builds on and extends
category 2 in order to guide actions that reduce negative out-
comes from climate change.
Cities facing water scarcity
Urban areas are often where interactions between socio-eco-
nomic, environmental, and infrastructural systems are revealed
during climate extremes, and cities facing water scarcity will
increasingly need to manage complex climate change risks.
Assessments that consider interacting risks (category 3) are
therefore integral to anticipating complex risk and supporting
decision making (Figure 5A). For example, the meteorological
conditions of the Cape Town Drought (2015–2018) were three
times more likely due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emis-
sions.104 However, effective responses to the drought were de-
layed due to the political risk of declaring a disaster and a lack
of feasible water supply alternatives.105 Responses became
increasingly urgent in early 2018 as the potential of a ‘‘day
zero’’ event became possible, the point at which a city of four
million people might run out of water.106 The risk of day zero
was anticipated to cascade to affect risks to health, economic
output, and security. A whole-of-society response was called
for from public and private actors as the local government’s
capability to manage the drought response was stretched to
its limit.106 The responses by different groups interacted to
generate risks to municipal finance. In particular, as elites in-
vested in private, off-grid water supplies,105,107 risk of reduced
municipal revenue collections from newly off-grid households
aggregated with risk of reduced tourism,106 increasing risk to
the reputation of the incumbent administration. The combina-
tion of these risks was not considered in planning scenarios
prior to the drought. As the city’s municipal budget was disrup-
ted, the political risks from capital-intensive responses such as
desalination and groundwater abstraction increased and com-
pounded with the ecological risks from proposed water
abstraction projects.
In the Cape Town case, building the complexity of risk assess-
ment from category 2 to category 3 has revealed preferred
response options. For example, considering interactions among
multiple response options for the risk to water supply (in line with
category 2) and their interaction across multiple risks (in line with
category 3) has led to the inclusion of ecosystem-based adapta-
tion in a new water-sensitive strategy for the city. The clearing of
invasive vegetation from catchments is recognized as the most
cost-effective way to add water to Cape Town’s hydrological
Figure 5. Case studies showing interactions of multiple risks, including compounding and cascading risk interactions, as well as
aggregations of risks
Interactions of multiple risks in (A) cities facing water scarcity, (B) fishing communities in the tropics, and (C) finance and banking affected by sea-level rise.
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system, as well as reducing risk to biodiversity, reducing risk
from wildfire, and increasing employment.108
Complex climate change risks can lead to a heightened risk of
crossing unknown response capacity tipping points.30 In the run
up to day zero, municipal officials developed a Critical Water
Shortages Disaster Plan that aimed for responses with street-
level specificity, but they faced a lack of detail on cascading
risks. When faced with such complex interacting risks, scenario
approaches focused on impact cascades109 or what-if scenario
planning can provide a flexible method for assessment of inter-
acting risks and can be deployed relatively rapidly.53,54,56 Sce-
nario approaches can also be combined with more quantitative
stress testing methods to identify where existing climate change
adaptation might be insufficient as potential weak points are
identified from risk interactions.110,111 Given deep uncertainty,
careful evaluation by a range of experts and stakeholders is a
necessary step in this process, and scenario and storyline ap-
proaches can be used to engage diverse stakeholders.56 There
must also be sustained co-production of risk assessments
amongmultiple stakeholders that leveragesmulti-level and poly-
centric governance approaches to climate change risk.
Fishing communities in the tropics
Themaximum catch potential of exploited fish species in tropical
regions is projected to decline as a result of climate change by as
much as 50% by 2050 relative to 2000–2010 levels.112 Increased
heat stress has already caused widespread coral bleaching,113
and future warming and acidification are projected to cause a
70%–90% loss of coral if global warming is not held below
1.5C above pre-industrial levels.6 These environmental
changes are projected to result in fishmigration across exclusive
economic zones, which creates potential for local and interna-
tional fisher conflict in the absence of effective governance
structures.76 Caribbean fishing communities illustrate how these
risks to tropical corals and fisheries can interact (Figure 5B). As
climate change increases risk to pelagic fish catches, small-
scale fishers tend to rely on fishing more in shallow waters.
This response to declining fish populations can increase risk to
coral reefs from switching to fishing techniques that are effective
in the short term but damaging to fish populations and corals.
Coral reefs act as a natural breakwater, reducing wave energy
by an average of 97%.114 The risk to reefs frommaladaptive fish-
ing practices and climate change can cascade to risks to human
life, infrastructure, and property on the coastline that is more
exposed towaves, storm surges, and coastal erosion during hur-
ricanes.114 Compounding the risks further, as catches decline,
fishers often draw down their assets, reducing their ability to
cope with, and rebuild after, hurricanes.115 Furthermore, dam-
age to coral reefs reduces tourism and associated cash flows,
which both provide income diversification but also capital to
develop alternative economic activity.115 Climate change risk
to pelagic fisheries therefore has potential to cascade to multiple
other risks facing fishing communities in the tropics.
Risk assessment and adaptation strategies that include local
and traditional knowledge, and associated sustainable manage-
ment practices, can help with understanding and addressing
complex climate change risks.116 For example, participatory
modeling that informs local communities about the projected
severity and timing of multiple climate hazards and co-develops
understanding of the local social-ecological systems that inte-
grate multiple risks can better identify response options, as
well as the limits of response.53,64 These approaches can be
combined with participatory monitoring in order to regularly up-
date assessments as new interactions of risk drivers or of multi-
ple risks are identified.
In contexts where it is difficult to know or agree on relation-
ships between actions and consequences, then robust deci-
sion-making tools using exploratory modeling can be used to
pressure test management approaches to myriad plausible in-
teractions of risks to identify robust adaptive strategies into the
future.117 Deep uncertainty analytical methods117 and systems
thinking in simple or modeled form35,64 can help identify the in-
teracting effects potentially most important to a specific risk
analysis.
Finance, banking, and insurance at the coast
As the interacting hazards of sea-level rise, heavy rainfall events,
flooding, and land instability compound at the coast, there is a
risk to the insured of higher premiums (Figure 5C).37 This risk
can cascade to risk of stranded assets as customers have to
choose to either pay higher deductibles to reduce increased pre-
miums, if they can afford to do so, or not hold insurance
coverage.37,118 As a result, they may stay put, abandon assets
and move, or rely on disaster relief and recovery funds from
the government (taxpayer) as an insurer of last resort. For policy
holders, this can create inequities and business risks. If home-
owners cannot get insurance, then property values will be
depressed. This can cascade to risk of foreclosure on loans
frombanks, risk of banks having tomaintain higher deposit ratios
(i.e., lend less), and risk of greatest impact on the most vulner-
able who are less able to pay, such as the elderly, low-income
residents, or exposed municipalities. Further, climate change
risks leave banks exposed because they hold long-term mort-
gages, often up to 30 years.37 Managing these diverse risks ex-
poses local government to its own set of risks, since community
opposition to coastal hazard management plans can initiate
broader opposition to local government strategies and long-
term community plans.119
Although climate change risk is currently not fully priced into
banking and (re)insurance markets, globally there is evidence
that the financial services sector is beginning to respond to
such risk signals by adopting risk-based pricing for high-inten-
sity rainfall events, sea-level rise, and drought.37,120 This cannot
be done without considering the full breadth of risks and the con-
nections between them.30 Critical systems thinking and path-
ways tools can be used to map the interconnections between
risks in the finance sector and help reveal where climate change
adaptation interventions can be focused. For example, partici-
patory approaches that use expert elicitation and visualize
cascading risks as causal diagrams can provide a robust and
flexible analytical framework for interacting risks and implica-
tions for management.121 For insurers, this would include funda-
mental shifts in ways of doing business to include iteratively
revised understandings of the probabilities of extreme events.30
Dynamic adaptive pathways can be employed to help planning
and guide responses under deep uncertainty.122 In such ap-
proaches, different response options are considered, including
the path dependencies among them through time (e.g., assets
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that will accumulate behind armored coastlines or the time
required to construct major new defenses). This can identify trig-
gers for timely adaptive actions (changes of pathway/behavior)
ahead of critical damage thresholds such as increased flooding
from sea-level rise,123 and the points at which new pathways are
triggered can be responsive to the difficult-to-quantify outcomes
of climate change risk.122 Co-creation of dynamic adaptive path-
ways can introduce new framings of risk using simulation games,
and involve partnerships among multiple stakeholders in a re-
gion that anticipate future interconnections between multiple
sectors, including private sector finance, different levels of gov-
ernment, and affected communities.95,122 Responses based on
such methods are usually more resilient and can be done at
any scale of assessment,124 and can be integrated with existing
risk screening tools, such as risk registers for climate extremes,
infrastructure costs, and finance uncertainties.26 An integral part
of such enhanced assessments is the ability to reflect economic,
social, and environmental constraints on resilience. Through
identifying how interacting risks affect social equity, interven-
tions can target incremental transformations that enhance resil-
ience capabilities for local communities.125,126 This enables the
interests of awider range of affected people to be included, lead-
ing to more credible, relevant, and lasting resilience.
CONCLUSION
Complex climate change risk assessment is a formidable and ur-
gent challenge. Although real-world experience underscores the
importance of interacting drivers of climate change risk and of in-
teractions among multiple risks, these risks have been incom-
pletely and inconsistently assessed to date. The framework pro-
vided here seeks to strengthen assessment of complex climate
change risks by clarifying the types of interactions that generate
risk, and where they originate. Moreover, the integration of re-
sponses into the climate change risk framework helps deepen un-
derstanding and increases the relevance of climate change risk
assessment for a diversity of decision makers, and can help
conceptualize risk trade-offs that are beingmade. Climate change
risk assessment may often begin at lower levels of complexity but
should be clear about the need to regularly update risk assess-
ments based on new knowledge of interacting risk drivers and in-
teracting risks. As environmental, social, and engineering sci-
ences make joint progress toward these goals, they are
beginning to yield more robust risk assessment and inform more
detailed decision making to match the complexity of climate
change risks.2,4,37,53 As climate change continues, further devel-
opment of these newapproaches to risk assessment anddecision
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Methods
Analysis of the IPCC report text was done with NVivo12, exploring where and
when types of complex risk and interactions between determinants of risk
were used in the three IPCC special reports produced between 2018 and
2019.5,6,11 These are compared with existing IPCC definitions, where such
definitions exist.
After this, an exploratory review of types of complex risk in peer-reviewed
literature since 2015, searched for [‘‘climat* change’’ risk AND ‘‘x’’] explored
each of the following descriptors of interaction linked with risk associated
with climate change: impact, effect, risk, hazard, vulnerability, and exposure:
aggregate, amplified, cascade, cascading, co-located coinciding, compound,
concurrent, correlated, cross effects, cumulative, domino effects, emergent,
hyper-, interacting, interconnected, interdependent, multi-, persistent, syn-
chronous, synergistic, systemic, teleconnected, telecoupling. The search
began with the first seven pages of Google Scholar and then took a snowball
approach exploring the citing articles identified. The search aimed to gain a
view on the breadth of the literature and framings of complex risk associated
with climate change rather than a systematic review of all published material
on each type of complex interaction. Literature highlighted by the team of
scholars involved in all three working groups of the IPCC AR6 were also
included where remaining gaps or emerging scholarship was identified. The
gathered literature was then explored for commonly used definitions and vari-
ety of descriptions of complex risk associated with climate change for compar-
ison with use, or lack of use, in IPCC special reports.
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cha, M.D., et al. (2020). A typology of compound weather and climate
events. Nat. Rev. Earth Environ. 1, 333–347. https://doi.org/10.1038/
s43017-020-0060-z.
32. Zscheischler, J. (2020). Moving beyond isolated events. Nat. Clim.
Change 10, 583. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0846-5.
33. Vogel, M.M., Zscheischler, J., Wartenburger, R., Dee, D., and Senevir-
atne, S.I. (2019). Concurrent 2018 hot extremes across northern hemi-
sphere due to human-induced climate change. Earths Future 7,
692–703. https://doi.org/10.1029/2019EF001189.
34. Wahl, T., Jain, S., Bender, J., Meyers, S.D., and Luther, M.E. (2015).
Increasing risk of compound flooding from storm surge and rainfall for
major US cities. Nat. Clim. Change 5, 1093–1097. https://doi.org/10.
1038/nclimate2736.
35. Bansal, R., and Ochoa, M. (2012). Temperature, aggregate risk, and ex-
pected returns (Working Paper 17575).
36. Li, T., Horton, R.M., Bader, D.A., Zhou,M., Liang, X., Ban, J., Sun, Q., and
Kinney, P.L. (2016). Aging will amplify the heat-related mortality risk un-
der a changing climate: projection for the elderly in Beijing, China. Sci.
Rep. 6, 28161. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep28161.
37. Lawrence, J., Blackett, P., and Cradock-Henry, N.A. (2020). Cascading
climate change impacts and implications. Clim. Risk Manage. 29,
100234. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2020.100234.
38. Pescaroli, G., and Alexander, D. (2018). Understanding compound, inter-
connected, interacting, and cascading risks: a holistic framework. Risk
Anal. 38, 2245–2257. https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13128.
39. Cavallo, A., and Ireland, V. (2014). Preparing for complex interdependent
risks: a system of systems approach to building disaster resilience. Int. J.
Disaster Risk Reduction 9, 181–193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.
05.001.
40. Terzi, S., Torresan, S., Schneiderbauer, S., Critto, A., Zebisch, M., and
Marcomini, A. (2019). Multi-risk assessment in mountain regions: a re-
view of modelling approaches for climate change adaptation.
J. Environ. Manage 232, 759–771. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.
2018.11.100.
41. King, D., Schrag, D., Dadi, Z., Ye, Q., and Ghosh, A. (2017). Climate
Change: A Risk Assessment (e Centre for Science and Policy [CSaP] Uni-
versity of Cambridge).
42. Schipper, E.L.F. (2020). Maladaptation: when adaptation to climate
change goes very wrong. One Earth 3, 409–414. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.oneear.2020.09.014.
43. IPCC (2014). Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnera-
bility. Part B: regional aspects. In Contribution of Working Group II to
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change Field, C.B.., V.R. Barros, and D.J. Dokken, et al., eds. (Cam-
bridge University Press), p. 688.
44. Scott, M., Lennon, M., Tubridy, D., Marchman, P., Siders, A.R., Main,
K.L., Herrmann, V., Butler, D., Frank, K., Bosomworth, K., et al. (2020).
Climate disruption and planning: resistance or retreat? Plann. Theor.
Pract. 21, 125–154. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2020.1704130.
45. Hanna, C., White, I., and Glavovic, B.C. (2021). Managed retreats by
whom and how? Identifying and delineating governance modalities.
Clim. Risk Manage. 31, 100278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2021.
100278.
46. Hillier, J.K., Matthews, T., Wilby, R.L., and Murphy, C. (2020). Multi-haz-
ard dependencies can increase or decrease risk. Nat. Clim. Change 10,
595–598. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0832-y.
47. Raymond, C., Matthews, T., and Horton, R.M. (2020). The emergence of




One Earth 4, April 23, 2021 499
Perspective
48. Mach, K.J., Kraan, C.M., Adger, W.N., Buhaug, H., Burke, M., Fearon,
J.D., Field, C.B., Hendrix, C.S., Maystadt, J.-F., O’Loughlin, J., et al.
(2019). Climate as a risk factor for armed conflict. Nature 1, 193–197.
49. USGCRP (2016). Executive summary. In The Impacts of Climate Change
on Human Health in the United States: A Scientific Assessment (U.S.
Global Change Research Program).
50. Shepherd, T., Jacob, D., Christensen, J.H., Alexander, L., Tegtmeier, S.,
and Doblas-Reyes, F. (2020). World Climate Research Programme Light-
house Activity.
51. FutureEarth. (2021). Knowledge-action networks. https://futureearth.
org/networks/knowledge-action-networks/for further details.
52. Hallegatte, S., Bangalore, M., Bonzanigo, L., Fay, M., Kane, T., Narloch,
U., Rozenberg, J., Treguer, D., and Vogt-Schilb, A. (2016). "Shock
Waves" Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on Poverty.
53. Dutra, L.X.C., Bayliss, P., McGregor, S., Christophersen, P., Scheepers,
K., Woodward, E., Ligtermoet, E., and Melo, L.F.C. (2018). Understand-
ing climate-change adaptation on Kakadu National Park, using a com-
bined diagnostic andmodelling framework: a case study at YellowWater
wetland. Mar. Freshw. Res. 69, 1146–1158.
54. Bayliss, P., Finlayson, C.M., Innes, J., Norman-López, A., Bartolo, R.,
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